Emotion and Implicit Timing: The Arousal Effect by Sylvie Droit-Volet & Mickaël Berthon
fpsyg-08-00176 February 11, 2017 Time: 14:46 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 14 February 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00176
Edited by:
Petko Kusev,
Kingston University, UK
Reviewed by:
Yuki Yamada,
Kyushu University, Japan
Paula Goolkasian,
University of North Carolina
at Charlotte, USA
*Correspondence:
Sylvie Droit-Volet
sylvie.droit-volet@uca.fr
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 27 November 2016
Accepted: 26 January 2017
Published: 14 February 2017
Citation:
Droit-Volet S and Berthon M (2017)
Emotion and Implicit Timing:
The Arousal Effect.
Front. Psychol. 8:176.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00176
Emotion and Implicit Timing: The
Arousal Effect
Sylvie Droit-Volet* and Mickaël Berthon
Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive, UMR 6024, CNRS, Université Clermont Auvergne, Clermont-Ferrand,
France
This study tested the effects of emotion on implicit time judgment. The participants did
not receive any overt temporal instructions. They were simply trained to respond as
quickly as possible after a response signal, which was separated from a warning signal
by a reference temporal interval. In the testing phase, the inter-signal interval was shorter,
equal or longer than the reference interval and was filled by emotional pictures (EP) of
different arousal levels: high, moderate, and low. The results showed a U-shaped curve
of reaction time plotted against the interval duration, indicating an implicit processing of
time. However, this RT-curve was shifted toward the left, with a significantly lower peak
time for the high-arousal than for the low-arousal EP. This emotional time distortion in an
implicit timing task suggests an automatic effect of emotion on the internal clock rate.
Keywords: timing, time, emotion, implicit timing
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, we feel that time expands or contracts according to our emotions, for example our
feelings of anger or joy toward our loved ones. This fluctuation of time judgment with emotion has
been experimentally examined in numerous studies with different emotional stimuli (e.g., affective
pictures, facial expressions, sounds). The results have systematically shown time distortions with
emotional stimuli, at least when they are highly arousing. Time distortions under the effect of
emotions are thus considered as a robust phenomenon (for a review, see Droit-Volet et al., 2013;
Lake, 2016). However, there is a debate about the mechanisms underpinning temporal emotional
effects. Some authors hold that attentional processes are involved, while others believe they are due
to arousal, which automatically increases the rate of the internal clock system.
Most studies on time and emotion in human adults have used explicit time judgment tasks, in
which participants are aware that they must estimate time and exercise cognitive control over the
contents of their minds. Cognitive executive functions (attention, decision) therefore contribute to
time judgment in this type of task. To further examine the idea of an automatic effect of emotion on
the internal clock, Droit-Volet (2016) recently decided to use an implicit timing paradigm in which
the processing of time is considered to be automatic or, at the least, places only limited demands
on attention (Zelaznik et al., 2002; Coull and Nobre, 2008; Merchant et al., 2008; Johnson et al.,
2015). In an implicit timing paradigm, the participants do not receive any temporal instruction.
For example, they may be presented with two successive signals and then have to press as quickly
as possible after the second signal. In this way, it has been demonstrated that the reaction time
(RT) for the second signal depends on the length of the interval between the warning and the
response signal (foreperiod). The RT is thus faster after a long than a short foreperiod (hazard
function: increasing probability of an event with elapsing time) (Niemi and Näätänen, 1981). After
a constant inter-signal interval, the RT is also faster for foreperiods close to this reference interval
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than for shorter or longer foreperiods (Piras and Coull, 2011;
Droit-Volet and Coull, 2016). This results in a U-shaped RT curve
when the RT is plotted against the different tested foreperiods.
The variation of RT as a function of the length of the foreperiod
reveals that the motor preparation depends on the temporal
interval between the warning and the response signal, and
consequently that the duration of this inter-signal interval has
been processed. In this type of implicit timing task, we can
therefore assume that the U-shaped RT curve will be shifted
toward the left under the effect of arousing emotional stimuli if
these do indeed automatically increase the rate of the internal
clock. According to the internal clock models (for a review, see
Wearden, 2016), when the rate of the internal clock increases,
more ticks (pulses, oscillations) are emitted per time unit. In a
temporal production task, the temporal target is then reached
faster, thus resulting in shorter estimates.
To further study this idea, Droit-Volet (2016) thus decided
to use an implicit time judgment task and to fill the interval
between the two signals with emotional stimuli: i.e., emotional
facial expressions (angry, sad and neutral facial expressions).
However, the results were not convincing. The RT curves were
shifted toward the left and indicated a lower peak time (minimum
value of the curve) for the angry than for the sad faces, which were
judged to be less arousing. However, no significant difference
was observed between the angry and the neutral faces. In
addition, and more problematically, the results did not reveal
any significant interaction between the emotional stimuli and the
foreperiod duration. The RT was always faster in response to
angry faces. This is consistent with an automatic acceleration of
motor executive functioning in response to an aggressive person,
regardless of the inter-signal interval (Woods et al., 2015). In
an implicit timing task based on RTs with very short interval
durations (<1 s), it is likely that this automatic acceleration of
RT for action readiness in a social interaction context (in front
aggressive facial expressions) masks the effects of emotion on the
processing of durations per se. Indeed, the emotional effects on
behavior depend on emotional stimuli used and their meaning
for individuals (Coan and Allen, 2007). Therefore, to verify the
effect of emotion on the RT in an implicit timing task, an implicit
timing paradigm similar to that used by Droit-Volet (2016) was
used in the present study, but with emotional pictures (EP) from
the International Affective Pictures System (IAPS, Lang et al.,
1999) which is standardized on the basis of ratings of pleasure
and arousal.
The aim of the present study was therefore to test the effect
of emotional stimuli on time judgment in an implicit timing task
with a constant interval between the warning and the response
signal in an initial phase and different inter-signal intervals
(equal, shorter, and longer) in a subsequent testing phase (see
Piras and Coull, 2011). In this task, the participants always had
to press as quickly as possible after the second signal. In our
experiment, color EP from the IAPS were selected based on
their level of arousal: high, moderate and low. In addition, each
participant rated the level of arousal induced by these pictures
on the Self-Assessment Manikin scale (SAM, Lang et al., 1999).
According to the hypothesis that the internal clock accelerates
automatically in the presence of High-Arousal (HA) emotions,
we expected to obtain an interaction effect between the inter-
signal interval duration and the emotional stimuli on the RT,
indicating a leftward shift of the U-shaped RT curve, with a lower
peak time, that increases with the increase in the arousal level
induced by the EP.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty undergraduate psychology students from Clermont
Auvergne University (mean age = 25.72, SD = 7.52, 36 females
and 14 males) participated in this experiment, which was
conducted in accordance with the Helsinki declaration. They
signed written informed consent before participating in this
study, which was approved by the Sud-Est VI statutory ethics
committee (CPP, France).
Material
In a quiet room in our laboratory, the participants were seated
in front a computer that controlled the experimental events
via E-prime. They responded on the “0” key of the computer’s
numeric keypad with the index finger of the dominant hand.
A 50-ms auditory stimulus (signal) was given at the onset and
the offset of the interval to be timed. Two types of pictures
were presented during this interval: a controlled non-emotional
picture (no-EP) and an emotional picture. The no-EP was a
scrambled black-and-white picture. The emotional pictures (EP)
were selected from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999) for their level of
arousal: High-Arousal (HA), Moderate-Arousal (MA) and Low-
Arousal (LA). The IAPS pictures for the High-Arousal pictures
were a (1) snake (IAPS picture number, n◦ 1120), (2) a nasty
Pitbull (n◦ 1300), and (3) a shark (n◦ 1930), for the MA pictures,
(1) a sad woman (n◦ 2271), an elderly woman (n◦ 2590), and
a woman in the rain (n◦ 9210), and for the LA pictures, (1) a
basket (n◦ 7010), a dustpan, (n◦ 7040) and an iron (n◦ 7030).
In addition, after the timing task, each participant assessed the
arousal level of the different EP they had seen using the 9-point
scale of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Lang et al., 1999).
The pictures were presented on the computer screen until the
participants completed the paper SAM scale.
Procedure
In the timing task, the participants did not receive any overt
temporal instruction. They were simply asked to press as quickly
as possible after the second auditory signal, which followed the
first one and was separated from it by a temporal interval.
These two signals were delivered 200 ms after the participant
initiated the trial by pressing on the spacebar of the computer
keyboard after the word “ready/prêt” presented on the center
of the computer screen. The inter-trial interval was randomly
chosen between 500 and 1000 ms. The timing task consisted of
a training and a testing phase. In the training phase (25 trials),
the inter-signal interval was always 500 ms (reference interval
duration). The participants were told that they had to learn to
press quickly after the second signal. In the testing phase (27
trials), they were only told that they had to continue doing
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what they had done before. However, the inter-signal interval
(probe interval durations) was similar to the reference duration
(500 ms), shorter (200, 300, 400 ms) or longer (600, 700, 800 ms)
than the reference duration. The probe interval duration similar
to the reference duration was presented 9 times (9 trials) and the
other probe interval durations were presented 3 times each (3
trials × 6). The trial presentation order was randomized within
each trial block (3 blocks of 9 trials).
The participants were assigned to the High-Arousal group (25
participants) or the Moderate-Arousal group (25 participants). In
each group, all participants were given two successive sessions
with the same timing tasks (training phase and testing phase),
except for the EP presented in the second session. In the first
session, the picture presented during the inter-signal interval
was always the control picture (no-EP) for both the training
and the testing phase. In the second session, the control picture
was always used for the training phase (no-EP), while EP were
presented for the testing phase. In the High-Arousal group, the
pictures were the HA and the LA EP. In the MA group, they were
the MA and the LA EP. As there were two types of EP during the
testing phase (HA vs. LA in the High-Arousal group, and MA vs.
LA in the MA group), this led to a total of 54 trials (2 EP × 27
trials). The EP were randomly presented within each block (3
blocks of 9 trials× 2).
RESULTS
Emotional Assessment
For each group taken separately, an ANOVA was performed
on the mean rating of arousal level for each type of emotional
picture. This ANOVA confirmed the effect of emotion for the HA
group, F(1,24) = 154.50, p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.87, and the MA
group, F(1,24) = 34.58, p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.59. This indicated
that the participants in the HA group judged the High-Arousal
EP (M = 5.80, SE = 0.37) to be more arousing than the LA
EP (M = 1.38, SE = 0.23). The participants in the MA group
also judged the MA EP (M = 4.69, SE = 0.37) to be more
arousing than the LA EP (M= 1.88, ES= 0.23), F(1,24)= 154.50,
p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.59. The ANOVA on the arousal ratings for
the LA EP with the group as factor found no difference between
groups, F(1,48) = 2.40, p = 0.13, while that on the pictures with
a higher arousal level showed an effect of group indicating that
the High-Arousal EP were judged more arousing than the MA
EP, F(1,48)= 4.47, p= 0.04, η2p = 0.09.
Reaction Time
The mean RT1 was measured on the different trials for each
emotional condition. Figure 1 shows the mean RT plotted against
the interval durations in the High-Arousal group (top) and the
Moderate-Arousal group (bottom). In all conditions, the RT
curves were U-shaped, with RT decreasing to a minimum before
increasing again. This demonstrates the persistence of implicit
processing of time in different emotional contexts. For the MA
1The mean percentage of RTs excluded from the analyses (i.e., <50 ms or
>1500 ms) was 1.59 (SD= 2.53) (see Piras and Coull, 2011).
FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction time (RT) plotted against the probe interval
durations for the High-Arousal group with the High-Arousal (HA-EP),
the Low-Arousal (LA-EP) emotional pictures and the no-emotional
pictures (No-EP), and for the Moderate-Arousal group with the
Moderate-Arousal (MA-EP), the Low-Arousal (LA-EP) emotional
pictures and the no-emotional pictures (No-EP).
group, the ANOVA performed on the RT with two within-
subjects factors (emotion and interval duration) found indeed a
significant effect of interval duration, F(6,144)= 9.26, p= 0.0001,
η2p = 0.28, with a significant quadratic effect, F(1,24) = 20.55,
p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.46. The effect of emotion, F(2,48) = 1.03,
p = 0.36, and the interaction between emotion and interval
duration were not significant, F(12,288) = 0.62, p = 0.82.
Consequently, in this group, the type of picture presented during
the inter-signal interval did not affect the U-shaped RT curve.
For the High-Arousal group, the same ANOVA performed on
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FIGURE 2 | Peak time of the U-shaped RT curve for the High-Arousal and the Moderate-Arousal group with the High-Arousal/Moderate-Arousal
emotional pictures, the Low-Arousal emotional pictures, and the no-emotional pictures.
the RT also found a significant main effect of interval duration,
F(6,144) = 7.71, p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.24, with a quadratic effect,
F(1,24) = 21.49, p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.47. However, in this case,
the emotion x interval duration interaction reached significance,
F(12,288) = 1.77, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.07, and subsumed no main
effect of emotion, F(2,48)= 0.19, p= 0.83. For the HA group, post
hoc analyses of the effects on the ANOVA was thus conducted
with the interval duration and the emotion (HA-EP vs. LA-
EP; no-EP vs. HA-EP; no-EP vs. LA-EP) as factors in order to
compare each emotional condition. The ANOVAs systematically
showed a main effect of interval duration (all p < 0.05), and
no main effect of emotion (p < 0.05). More interestingly, the
emotion x interval duration interaction was significant when the
HA EP were compared with the LA EP, F(6,144)= 2.95, p= 0.01,
η2p = 0.11. This interaction was not significant for the other
comparisons: no-EP vs. LA-EP, F(6,144) = 0.65, p = 0.69, no-
EP vs. HA-EP, F(6,144) = 1.46, p = 0.20. In sum, there was a
significant leftward shift of the U-shaped curve for the HA EP in
comparison to the LA EP, with the no-EP curve located halfway
between them.
Peak Time
To further examine the leftward shift of the RT curves, we
measured the peak time (minimum value) of the U-shaped curves
by fitting each individual curve with the polynomial function
from the GraphPad Prism program. The polynomial function
provided reasonably good fits of the temporal curves for most of
the participants (all p< 0.05). However, the fit was not significant
for eight participants in at least one emotional condition. In
such cases, we simply took the probe duration corresponding to
the lowest RT value. This was not possible for two participants
who produced low RT at different probe durations. They were
therefore excluded from subsequent statistical analyses. Figure 2
shows the peak time obtained in this way in the HA and MA
groups. The ANOVA performed on the peak time showed a
significant effect of emotion for the HA group, F(2,46) = 5.25,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.19, but not for the MA group, F(2,46) = 0.44,
p = 0.65. In the HA group, the peak time was thus lower for
the HA EP (M = 415.68, SD = 157.81) than for the LA EP
(M = 529.75, SD = 159.91), t(23) = 3.55, p = 0.002, d = 0.72.
No other significant difference was observed.
In addition, we analyzed the correlation between (1) the
difference in the peak time for the LA-EP and that for the more
highly arousing pictures (MA or HA) and (2) the difference
in the self-arousal rating between these two types of pictures.
A significant correlation was observed (r = 0.39, p = 0.03),
demonstrating that the difference in the peak time between
the LA and the MA/HA EP increased with the increase in the
difference in the arousal assessment of the EP. In other words,
the decrease in the peak time of the RT curve for the arousing
pictures compared to the LA pictures became greater as the level
of experienced arousal increased.
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the effects of emotion on implicit timing
by using EP from the IAPS with different arousal levels. The
results showed that the RT was faster for the interval duration
close to the reference interval duration in all conditions, thus
yielding a U-shaped curve. This finding confirms that the
processing of time is not disrupted by the emotional context in an
implicit timing task as has been shown in tasks examining explicit
time judgment. Human beings therefore maintain their ability to
discriminate durations in most contexts.
However, some time distortions occurred with the emotional
stimuli. Indeed, our results showed that the U-shaped RT curve
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was shifted toward the left, with a significantly lower peak time,
for the high-arousal emotion compared to the LA emotion. This
leftward shift of the RT curve was not observed between emotions
of lower arousal levels: i.e., moderate and low. When the
individual arousal level was judged low on the 9-point scale of the
SAM (<5), no difference in time judgment was observed between
the MA, the LA and the control picture (scrambled black-
and-white picture). This indicates that significant differences in
the perception of time occur only when the difference in the
arousal level is sufficiently high. The level of arousal induced
by the perception of emotional stimuli is thus one of the major
affective dimensions that produce distortions in the perception
of durations. Our results showed that the magnitude of the time
distortion (leftward shifting of peak time) was indeed positively
correlated with the self-reported assessment of arousal level: The
more alert the subjects felt in response to arousing pictures
(HA, MA), the shorter their estimates were. Our results therefore
support the evidence indicating that the effects of emotion on
time perception are mediated by arousal (Mella et al., 2010;
Dirnberger et al., 2012; Gil and Droit-Volet, 2012; Fayolle et al.,
2015). They also support the findings showing that the extent
of time distortions depends on individual levels of alertness:
i.e., individual emotionality (Tipples, 2011), individual level of
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Jusyte et al., 2015; Yoo and
Lee, 2015), individual alerting efficiency (Liu et al., 2015), or
individual emotional reactivity in response to specific images
(spider phobia) (Buetti and Lleras, 2012; Tipples, 2015). However,
our study tested the effect of arousal and not that of valence
as only stimuli of negative valence were used. The interaction
between these two affective dimensions must be examined in
future experiments.
In addition, our statistical analyses revealed a significant
interaction between emotion and the duration of the interval
between the warning and the response signal in the HA group,
but without any main effect of emotion. The participants did not
therefore always press faster for the highly arousing emotional
stimuli, regardless of the inter-signal interval duration. In other
words, the effects of emotion on RT varied as a function of the
inter-signal interval durations. Consequently, we can conclude
that the emotional stimuli directly affected the processing of time
in the present study. This significant interaction was not found in
the experiment conducted by Droit-Volet (2016) with emotional
facial expressions and a similar temporal task (although the
auditory signal was 50 ms in our study instead of 100 ms in
her study). In Droit-Volet’s experiment, the RT was always faster
for the angry faces than for the other faces regardless of the
foreperiod. There was thus an automatic increase in executive
motor function in preparation to act in response to an aggressive
face (Woods et al., 2015). Finally, this specific face-related issue
contributed greatly to preventing the emergence of a clear
emotional effect on timing in a RT-based task. This highlights the
importance for the investigation of temporal emotional effects
of the type of emotional stimuli used, of their meaning for
individuals, and of the task used (Gil and Droit-Volet, 2012).
The significant interaction between emotion and inter-signal
interval duration validates the hypothesis of an automatic
acceleration of the internal clock system under the effect of
arousal induced by the emotional stimuli. Indeed, arousal enabled
the emotional stimuli to speed up the rate of the internal clock,
with the result that the time criterion was reached earlier (shorter
estimates). Numerous authors defend this clock-based hypothesis
(Lake, 2016). Indeed, it is well established that high-arousal
situations (threatening situations) produce a release of dopamine
in the brain, and that the amount of cerebral dopamine affects
the internal clock rate (Cheng et al., 2016). However, our study
with an implicit timing task provides additional data suggesting
that this emotional clock-related effect is automatic, i.e., it occurs
even when the processing of time does not require attention.
In other words, the effect of high-arousal emotions on implicit
timing would not be mediated by changes in the amount of
attention allocated to temporal information. This is in line with
the studies showing the persistence of emotional effects on time
judgment in children with different attentional abilities (Gil et al.,
2007), in tasks of different degrees of difficulty (Droit-Volet
et al., 2016) or with masked emotional pictures (Yamada and
Kawabe, 2011). However, it is necessary to remember that the
automatic or non-automatic nature of the processing of time
in implicit temporal tasks, such as the one used in our study,
is a subject of discussion (Vallesi et al., 2014). Some authors
therefore simply prefer to consider that temporal processing is
less attentionally demanding in these tasks (Coull and Nobre,
2008). Consequently, our results suggest that the acceleration
of the internal clock under the effect of high-arousal emotion
produces time distortions whatever the quantity of attentional
resources needed to process time. Obviously this does not mean
that attentional processes do not contribute to time judgment
in emotional situations. It has been shown that attentional
processes (attention detection) trigger emotional reactions to
stimuli (Vuilleumier, 2005). Droit-Volet et al. (2015) have also
shown that the self-control activity allows the participants
to regulate (decrease) the impact of emotion on their time
judgments. In conclusion, the effect of high-arousal emotions
on time perception due to a speeding-up of the internal clock
induced by the increase of arousal was confirmed for implicit
timing in the present study just as it has been confirmed for
explicit timing in other studies.
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